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Abstract
Remote user authentication is desirable for a Telecare medicine in-
formation system (TMIS) to verify the correctness of remote users. In
2013, Jiang et al. proposed privacy preserving authentication scheme
for TMIS. Recently, Wu and Xu analyzed Jiang’s scheme and identify
serious security flaws in their scheme, namely, user impersonation at-
tack, DoS attack and off-line password guessing attack. In this article,
we analyze Wu and Xu’s scheme and show that their scheme is also
vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and does not protect
user anonymity. Moreover, we identify the inefficiency of incorrect
input detection of the login phase in Wu and Xu’s scheme, where the
smart card executes the login session in-spite of wrong input.
keywords: Telecare medicine information system; Smart card; Remote user
authentication; Biometric; Password.
1 Introduction
Telecare medicine information system (TMIS) provides efficient medical ser-
vices for remote user. In these online services user and medical server com-
municate via public channel, which increases security and privacy threat.
Although, password based authentication schemes provides efficient remote
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user authentication mechanism for TMIS, where user and server can mutu-
ally authenticate each other and establish a secure session by drawing unique
session key for each session. In recent years many password based authen-
tication schemes have been proposed for TMIS [3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 14, 15, 18],
which tries to provide two factor authentication.
In 2010, Wu et al. [14] presented an efficient authentication scheme for
TMIS. Their scheme is better than the before proposed schemes for low
computing devices, which added pre-computing phase. In this phase, user
performs exponential operation and then stores the calculated values into
the storage device, where user can extract them from the device when re-
quired. However, Debiao et al. [5] demonstrated that Wu et al.’s scheme does
not resist the impersonation attack to the insider’s attack and introduced an
enhanced scheme that eliminates the drawbacks of Wu et al.’s scheme. Ad-
ditionally, it performs better than Wu et al.’s scheme. They also claimed
that their scheme is more appropriate to low power mobile devices for TMIS.
In 2012, Wei et al. [12] identified that both Wu et al.’s and Debiao et al.’s
schemes are failed to meet two-factor authentication, although an efficient
smart card based password authentication schemes should support two-factor
authentication. They also presented an improved authentication scheme for
TMIS and claimed that the improved scheme is efficient and achieved two-
factor authentication. However, Zhu [18] demonstrated that Wei et al.’s
scheme is vulnerable to an off-line password guessing attack using stolen
smart card. He also presented an improved authentication scheme for TMIS
and claimed that his scheme could overcome the weaknesses of Wei et al.’s
scheme. In 2012, Chen et al. [4] also presented an efficient and secure dynamic
ID-based authentication scheme for TMIS. In 2013, Jiang et al. [7] showed
that does not achieve user anonymity and presented an improved scheme.
Recently, Wu and Xu demonstrated that Jiang et al.’s scheme is vulnera-
ble to vulnerable to user impersonation attack, off-line password guessing
attack and DoS attack. They also presented an improved scheme for TMIS
and claimed that their scheme overcomes the disadvantages of Jiang et al.’s
scheme and is suitable for TMIS.
In this article, we analyze the Wu and Xu’s password based remote user
authentication scheme for TMIS. We noted that Wu and Xu’s scheme does
not present efficient login and user-friendly password change phase. Ineffi-
ciency of login phase in incorrect input detection causes extra communication
and computation overhead, as smart card executes the login session in-spite
of wrong identity and password input. Moreover, Wu and Xu’s scheme is
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vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks and does not protect user
anonymity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the brief review of Wu and
Xu’s scheme is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we demonstrate the
weaknesses of Wu and Xu’s scheme. The conclusion is drawn in Section 4.
2 Review of Wu and Xu’s Scheme
We will define all the notation
Table 1: Meaning of symbols used throughout the paper
Notation Descryption
Ui User i
S A trustworthy medical server
E Attacker/adversory
IDi Unique identity of user i
PWi Unique password of user i
N Registration time of user
Ti Timestamp generated by Ui
Ts Timestamp generated by S
sk Session key
x Master key of S
E(x)(M) Symmetric key encryption of message M using key x
D(x)(M) Symmetric key decryption of message M using key x
h(·) A collision free one-way hash function
⊕ XOR
|| String concatenation operation
In 2013, Wu and Xu [13] proposed an improvement of Jiang et al.’s [7] pri-
vacy enhanced password-based authentication scheme for TMIS. This com-
prises following five phases:
Registration
Login
Authentication
3
Password change
Lost smart card revocation
In this section, we will briefly discuss registration, Login and authenti-
cation phases of Wu and Xu’s scheme, as we use only these phases in our
discussion. For more detailed study of Wu and Xu’s scheme, one can re-
fer [13].
2.1 Registration Phase
In registration phase, a new user registers to the server and achieves the
smart card as follows:
Step 1. Ui chooses his identity IDi and password PWi, and generates a
random number ri. He computes RPWi = h(ri||PWi), then sends the
message < IDi, RPWi > to S via secure channel.
Step 2. Upon receiving the registration request, S verifies the validity of
IDi. If verification does not hold, it terminates the session. Otherwise,
if Ui is a new user, S computes Ji = h(x||IDi||N), Li = Ji ⊕ RPWi
and ei = h(x) ⊕ h(RPWi||IDi), where N = 0 for new user, otherwise
N = N + 1. Then, S embeds {Li, ei, h(·), Ekey(·), Dkey(·)} into smart
card and issues the smart card to S. Moreover, S also includes (IDi, N)
into its database.
Step 3. Upon receiving the smart card, Ui stores ri into the smart card.
2.2 Login Phase
When a user wishes to login to the server, he first inserts his smart card into
the card reader and inputs the identity IDi and password PWi, then login
process executes as follows:
Step 1. Smart card computes RPWi = h(ri||PWi), Ji = Li ⊕ RPWi and
AID = ei⊕h(RPWi||IDi)⊕h(Ti)⊕IDi, B1 = ei⊕h(RPWi||IDi)⊕Ti,
Vi = h(Ti||Ji) and C1 = Eh(Ti)(AIDi||Ti||Vi).
Step 2. Smart card sends the login message < B1, C1 > to S.
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2.3 Authentication Phase
User and server performs the following steps to mutually authenticate each
other:
Step 1. Upon receiving the message < B1, C1 >, S achieves T
′
i = B1 ⊕
h(x) and verifies the validity of timestamp. If timestamp is invalid, it
terminates the session. Otherwise, S computes h(T ′i ) and decrypts C1
with h(T ′i ) and achieves AID
′
i, T
′′
i and V
′
i . Then S verifies the condition
T ′i =? T
′′
i . If the condition does not hold, it terminates the session.
Otherwise, S computes ID′i = AID
′ ⊕ h(x)⊕ h(T ′i ), then searches ID
′
i
in its database. If search fails, it terminates the session. Otherwise, S
achieves N from its database and computes J ′i = h(x||ID
′
i||N), then
verifies V ′i = h(T
′
i ||J
′
i). If verification does not hold, it terminates the
session. Otherwise, it runs Step 2.
Step 2. S computes B2 = h(x)⊕Ts, C2 = Eh(Ts)(V
′
i ||Ts) and sk = h(J
′
i ||T
′
i ||Ts||
ID′i). Then, S sends the message < B2, C2 > to U .
Step 3. Upon receiving the message < B2, C2 >, smart card computes
T ′s = B2⊕ei⊕h(RPWi||IDi). Then, it verifies the validity of T
′
s. If ver-
ification holds, it decrypts C2 using h(T
′
s), i.e., Dh(T ′s)(C2) = V
′′
i ||T
′′
s .
Finally, it verifies V ′′i =? Vi and T
′′
i =? T
′
i . If verification does not
succeed, it ends the session. Otherwise, it computes the session key
sk = h(Ji||Ti||T
′
s||IDi).
3 Cryptanalysis of Wu and XU’s Scheme
In this section, we show that Wu and XU’s Scheme [17] does not efficient
login and user-friendly password change phase. Moreover, their scheme is
vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack and does not protect user’s
anonymity. This analysis is based on the on the following assumptions, which
are stated in the literature [2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 1, 16].
− An adversary is able to extract the information from the smart card or
mobile device.
− An adversary is able to eavesdrop all the messages between user and
server, which transmits via public channel. Moreover, is able to modify,
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delete and resend all the messages, and can also reroute any message
to any other principal.
− An adversary may be a legitimate user or an outsider and can register
as a legitimate user and achieve the smart card.
Due to above mentioned assumptions, an adversary can achieve the pa-
rameters {Li = Ji⊕RPWi, ei = h(x)⊕h(RPWi||IDi), ri, h(·), Ekey(·), Dkey(·)}
from the smart card and can intercept and record the messages < B1, C1 >
and < B2, C2 >, which transmits via public channel.
3.1 Off-line password guessing attack
The password guessing attack is the most common attack on password based
authentication protocols. Although an efficient authentication scheme should
resist password guessing attack. When we investigated Wu and Xu’s scheme,
we identify that their scheme does not withstand Off-line password guessing
attack. This is clear from the following facts:
Step p1. An attacker achieve the stored parameters {Li, ei, ri, h(·), Ekey(·),
Dkey(·)} from the smart card, where Li = Ji ⊕ RPWi and ei = h(x)⊕
h(RPWi||IDi).
Step p2. An attacker can intercept user’s message < B1, C1 > and record
it, where B1 = ei ⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ Ti = h(x)⊕ Ti, Vi = h(Ti||Ji) and
C1 = Eh(Ti)(AIDi||Ti||Vi).
Step p3. An attacker E may be a legitimate user, then by using his iden-
tity IDE and password PWE, he can achieve the smart card with
the personalized parameters {LE, eE , rE, h(·), Ekey(·), Dkey(·)}, where
RPWE = h(rE ||PWE), LE = JE ⊕RPWE and eE = h(x)⊕h(RPWE||
IDE) by registering to S. With the help of achieved parameters, at-
tacker can achieve h(x) as follows:
• Compute RPWE = h(rE ||PWE).
• Compute h(x) = eE ⊕ h(RPWE ||IDE).
Step p4. Attacker guesses user Ui password PW
∗ and compute RPW ∗i =
h(ri||PW
∗
i ) and J
∗
i = Li⊕RPW
∗
i , then achieves Ti from Bi as Ti = Bi⊕
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h(x). Then, attacker decrypts Ci using h(Ti) and achieves (AIDi||Ti||Vi),
as Dh(Ti)(C1) = Dh(Ti)(Eh(Ti)(AIDi||Ti||Vi)) = (AIDi||Ti||Vi). Finally,
an attacker verifies the guessed password using the condition Vi =
? h(Ti||J
∗
i ).
Step p5. If the verification succeeds, then the password guessing succeeds.
Otherwise, the attacker repeats Step p4.
3.2 Flow in privacy protection
Wu and Xu’s claimed that their scheme protect user anonymity. However,
we identify that an attacker can easily track the user in Wu and Xu’s scheme
by performing the following steps:
• An attacker can intercept the user Ui’s login message and achieve <
B1, C1 >.
• An attacker can achieve h(x), as discussed in Step p3. An attacker can
also achieve Ti from B1 as B1 = h(x)⊕ Ti.
• With the help of achieved Ti, an attacker can decrypt Ci, i.e.,Dh(Ti)(C1) =
Dh(Ti)(Eh(Ti)(AIDi||Ti||Vi)) = (AIDi||Ti||Vi), where AID = ei⊕h(RPWi||IDi)⊕
h(Ti)⊕ IDi.
• An attacker can achieve user identity IDi using AIDi, h(x) and h(Ti)
as follows:
AIDi ⊕ h(x)⊕ h(Ti) = ei ⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ h(Ti)⊕ IDi ⊕ h(x)⊕ h(Ti)
= h(x)⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ IDi ⊕ h(x)
= IDi
The above discussion shows that, an adversary can achieve user identity
from the intercepted message. This shows that Wu and Xu’s scheme is failed
to prove its claim of user anonymity.
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3.3 Flaws in login phase
In Wu and Xu’s scheme, smart card does not verify the correctness of input,
i.e., correctness of identity and password in login phase. However, a user
may enter wrong password or identity due to mistake. If a user enters wrong
input, then the following cases are possible:
Case 1: If a user inputs wrong password PW ∗i due to mistake. The smart
card still executes the login phase as follows:
• Without verifying the correctness of input, the smart card computes
RPW ∗i = h(ri||PW
∗
i ) 6= h(ri||PWi) = RPWi as PWi 6= PW
∗
i and
J∗i = Li ⊕ RPW
∗
i .
• Then, the smart card computes AID∗i and B
∗
i as follows:
AID∗i = ei ⊕ h(RPW
∗
i ||IDi)⊕ h(Ti)⊕ IDi
= h(x)⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ h(RPW
∗
i ||IDi)⊕ h(Ti)⊕ IDi
6= h(x)⊕ h(Ti)⊕ IDi, as h(RPWi||IDi) 6= h(RPW
∗
i ||IDi)
B∗1 = ei ⊕ h(RPW
∗
i ||IDi)⊕ Ti
= h(x)⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ h(RPW
∗
i ||IDi)⊕ Ti
6= h(x)⊕ Ti as h(RPW
∗
i ||IDi) 6= h(RPWi||IDi)
• Smart card also computes V ∗i = h(Ti||J
∗
i ) andC
∗
1 = Eh(Ti)(AID
∗
i ||Ti||Vi).
Finally, it sends the login message < B∗1 , C
∗
1 > to S.
• Upon receiving the message < B∗1 , C
∗
1 >, S computes T
∗
i = B
∗
1⊕h(x) 6=
Ti, as B
∗
1 6= h(x) ⊕ Ti. The verification of timestamp does not holds.
Moreover, when S try to decrypt C∗i , the procedure fails, as S could
not achieve correct Ti.
• It is clear that in case of wrong password input, the verification does
not hold at server end. Thus, S terminates the session.
Case 2: If a user inputs the incorrect identity ID∗i , the smart card does not
verify the correctness of identity and executes the session as follows:
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• Without verifying the correctness of input, the smart card computes
RPWi = h(ri||PWi), Ji = Li⊕RPWi. Then, smart card computes the
following values:
AID∗i = ei ⊕ h(RPWi||ID
∗
i )⊕ h(Ti)⊕ ID
∗
i
= h(x)⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ h(RPWi||ID
∗
i )⊕ h(Ti)⊕ ID
∗
i
6= h(x)⊕ h(Ti)⊕ IDi, as IDi 6= ID
∗
i
B∗1 = ei ⊕ h(RPWi||ID
∗
i )⊕ Ti
= h(x)⊕ h(RPWi||IDi)⊕ h(RPWi||ID
∗
i )⊕ Ti
6= h(x)⊕ Ti as h(RPWi||IDi) 6= h(RPWi||ID
∗
i )
• The smart card also computes Vi = h(Ti||Ji) and C
∗
1 = Eh(Ti)(AID
∗
i ||Ti||Vi).
Finally, it sends the login message < B∗1 , C
∗
1 > to S.
• Upon receiving the message < B∗1 , C
∗
1 >, S computes T
∗
i = B
∗
1⊕h(x) 6=
Ti, as B
∗
1 6= h(x) ⊕ Ti. The verification of timestamp does not holds.
Moreover, when S tries to decrypt C∗i , the procedure fails, as S could
not achieve correct Ti.
• It is clear that in case if user inputs wrong identity, the verification
does not hold at server end. Thus, S terminates the session.
It is clear from the above discussion that in case of wrong input smart card
execute the session. Moreover, due to inefficiency of incorrect input detection,
sever may flooded with fraud inputs. This will decrease the efficiency of the
system.
3.4 Unfriendly password changes phase
In the proposed scheme, the user has to establish an authorized session with
the server, i.e., the user can not change his password independently. A user
has to depend on server to change his password. However, password change
phase should be user-friendly where a user can change his password without
server assistance.
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4 Conclusion
The password based authentication schemes provide efficient and scalable
solutions for remote user authentication. Recently, Jiang et al. proposed a
password based remote user authentication scheme for the TMIS. In more
recent work of Wu and Xu identified the vulnerability of Jiang et al.’s scheme
to resist denial-of-service attack, off-line password guessing attack and user
impersonation attack. Further, they proposed an improved scheme to over-
come the disadvantage of Jiang et al.’s scheme. In this paper, we analyzed
Wu and Xu’s scheme and identified that their scheme is vulnerable to off-
line password guessing attack and fails to present efficient login phase phase,
where smart card can identify the incorrect input. Moreover, we showed that
Wu and Xu’s scheme does not protect user anonymity.
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